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This chapter considers the implications of convergence for media policy from three 
perspectives. First, it discusses what have been the traditional concerns of media 
policy, and the challenges it faces, from the perspectives of public interest theories, 
economic capture theories, and capitalist state theories. Second, it looks at what media 
convergence involves, and some of the dilemmas arising from convergent media 
policy including: (1) determining who is a media company; (2) regulatory parity 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ media; (3) treatment of similar media content across 
different platforms; (4) distinguishing ‘big media’ from user-created content; and (5) 
maintaining a distinction between media regulation and censorship of personal 
communication. Finally, it discusses attempts to reform media policy in light of these 
changes, including Australian media policy reports from 2011-12 including the 
Convergence Review, the Finkelstein Review of News Media, and the Australian Law 
Reform Commission’s National Classification Scheme Review. It concludes by 
arguing that ‘public interest’ approaches to media policy continue to have validity, 
even as they grapple with the complex question of how to understand the concept of 
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Media Policy and Regulation: Competing Perspectives 
 
It has been said that “regulation of the media of communication is as old as blood 
feuds over insults, and … as classic as issue as deciding whose turn it is to use the 
talking drum or the ram’s horn” (Michael 1990, 40). Yet we are at a historical 
juncture in the early 21st century where questions of how media are regulated, how 
they should be regulated, and whether they should be regulated at all, are being asked 
worldwide.  
 
The Internet and media convergence have been key driver of the need to rethink 
media regulation. There have been a series of drivers of change in the media 
environment that necessitate new approaches to media policy, associated with media 
globalization, the blurring of boundaries between media forms and industries, and the 
greater ability of media consumers to themselves become producers of media content 
and distribute this material across global media platforms. Moreover, the same media 
content can increasingly be accessed across multiple devices, including tablet PCs, 
smart phones, and Internet-enabled ‘smart’ televisions. Such changes have been seen 
as marking a shift from the mass communications media paradigm of the 20th century, 
towards a convergent social media paradigm, requiring not only new policies for new 
media, but a wider rethink of both the principles of media policy and the regulatory 
instruments through which it is enacted (Flew 2011).  
 
National media regulation developed over the 20th century with the rise of mass media 
of film, broadcasting and, to a lesser degree, print. In particular, broadcast media were 
subject to extensive government regulation on the basis of ‘public good’ 
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characteristics of the media product, and the need to manage access to spectrum. 
Industry-specific regulations governing ownership, content and standards were 
developed, arising from the perceived centrality of the broadcast medium to public 
communication, the capacity of media owners to influence public debate, and 
concerns about potential risks to children and others from exposure to harmful media 
content (Doyle 2002; Picard 2011). While many of these regulations are ‘negative’ in 
the sense of setting controls over access to broadcasting licences or restrictions on 
what can be screened, there have also been more ‘positive’ regulations, that aim to 
stimulate various forms of local content production, including local drama, provision 
for cultural and linguistic minorities, children’s programming, and documentary and 
factual programming.   
 
Public service media have been central to such provision in many parts of the world, 
and until the 1980s held a monopoly over broadcasting in many nations. In Europe, 
where public service broadcasting has been strongest, the European Union approved a 
protocol that defined the mission of public broadcasting as being “directly related to 
the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve 
media pluralism” (Schejter 2008). In other parts of the world, such as Canada, Japan 
and Australia, public service broadcasting exists as part of a ‘dual system’ with 
regulated public broadcasters, who have legislated requirements in terms of local 
content provision. Even in the United States, typically seen as the least regulated 
media market, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has sought to 
maintain principle such as localism, where the ‘public interest’ obligations of 
broadcast licencees include the expectation that they provide programming that will 
“serve the needs and interests of their communities of license” (FCC 2008).  
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In terms of why media regulations take the form they do, the principal answer has 
been that they serve the public interest. Robert Horwitz has observed that “the 
‘official’ view of legislative intent” is one where: 
 
Regulation is established in response to the conflict between private 
corporations and the general public. The creation of regulatory agencies is 
viewed as the concrete expression of the spirit of democratic reform (Horwitz 
1989, 23).  
 
In relation to media policy, van Cuilenburg and McQuail have observed that: 
 
Policy formation in this, as in other fields, is generally guided by a notion of 
the ‘public interest’, which democratic states are expected to pursue on behalf 
of their citizens. In general, a matter of ‘public interest’ is one that affects the 
society as a whole (or sections of it) rather than just the individuals 
immediately involved or directly affected (van Cuilenburg and McQuail 2003, 
182).  
 
The criticism of public interest theories of regulation has been about whether they are 
naïve in terms of understanding actual practices of media policy and regulation. The 
normative proposition is that “regulatory administration neither adds to nor subtracts 
from the policy decided by law makers … [and] civil servants are simply office 
carriers dedicated to carrying out the duties that constitute their particular role” 
(Christensen 2011, 97-8). However, critics have argued that the history and conduct 
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of regulatory institutions has seen regulatory failure, arising out of factors such as 
media regulators developing a common worldview with the industries they regulate, 
the ability of regulated industries to influence regulator conduct, and ways in which 
the political process bears upon how regulators approach the industry in question 
(Horwitz 1989, 27-9).  
 
The critique of public interest theories of regulation has gone in two very distinct 
directions. Economic capture theories have argued that regulatory failure arises out of 
two inter-related processes: regulated businesses use the process as a way of securing 
economic rents and controlling the entry of new competitors into the market, while 
government regulators maximize self-interest by working closely with regulated 
businesses, to the apparent detriment of the public interest (Christensen 2011, 97-9). 
Drawing upon neo-classical economics, and applying rational choice theory to the 
political and policy spheres, these theories identify the problem of regulatory reform 
as being one where the benefits of the status quo are concentrated among a small 
number of industry and policy “insiders”, and the costs of change are well understood 
by these interests, whereas the benefits of change are more uncertain and diffused 
among the population more broadly (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987, 108-11).  
 
As these theories are typically put forward by those with a strong belief in the positive 
role played by markets in economic life, the characteristic recommendation arising is 
that there should be deregulation, or a reduced role of governments in controlling the 
activities of private corporations, combined with measures to increase the level of 
overall competition in those industries (Berg 2008; c.f. Stedman-Jones 2012, 126-33). 
Alternatively, technological change and changing consumer tastes and preferences are 
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themselves drivers of change: the take-up of cable and satellite television in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and the role now being played by the Internet in enabling alternative 
modes of content delivery and new services, are seen as undermining the traditional 
foundations of media regulation.  
 
The second major critique of public interest theories of regulation comes from 
capitalist state theories, which have viewed liberal pluralism as both politically naïve 
and intellectually complicit in regimes of power and domination. They argue that 
regulatory agencies, and particularly those who head them, come to hold common 
class interests with dominant corporate interests. Ralph Miliband proposed, in The 
State in Capitalist Society (Miliband 1968), that the locus of state power in modern 
capitalist societies had “shifted from the legislative to the executive branch of 
government and to independent administrative or regulatory agencies” (Barrow 2007, 
91). This meant that even though governments “speak in the name of the state and are 
formally invested with state power [that] does not mean that they effectively control 
that power” (Miliband 1968, 49-50). In the current context, such arguments have been 
associated with critiques of the political ideology of neoliberalism, where it is argued 
that “human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills, within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade”, and that “the role of the state is to create 
and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” (Harvey, 2005: 
2).  
 
A number of authors have argued that neoliberalism has been the ascendant ideology 
in media policy internationally since the 1980s. David Hesmondhalgh proposed that 
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the political influence of neoliberalism “helped to de-legitimate public ownership and 
certain forms of regulation in nearly all forms of economic activity” (Hesmondhalgh 
2013, 131). Des Freedman argued that a shift towards neoliberalism in U.S. and U.K. 
media policy drove “a much narrower and more consumer-oriented role for the 
media” and a much greater focus on “the largely economic benefits that may accrue 
from the exploitation of the media industries” (Freedman 2008, 219). Toby Miller has 
summarised neoliberalism as a doctrine that “understood people exclusively through 
the precepts of selfishness … [and] exercised power on people by governing them 
through market imperatives” (Miller 2009, 271).  
 
We can note, then, that arguments for media policy reform to address the challenges 
of convergence can be interpreted as being about government regulation better 
serving the public interest in a time of rapid change. But this is clearly not the only 
interpretation. From the perspective of economic capture theories, much of this is a 
misguided attempt to hold back the forces of technological change that may even be a 
threat to individual liberties. Chris Berg from the Institute of Public Affairs, a public 
policy think tank that “supports the free market of ideas, the free flow of capital, [and] 
a limited and efficient government” (IPA 2013) has put forward such arguments: 
 
[Media] regulations rest on an outdated conceptual framework. They assume 
that there is a fixed pie of media content and media outlets - there can only be 
so many television or radio stations, for instance … But this model is entirely 
unsuited to the contemporary media landscape. Gone are the days when our 
consumption of news and opinion was constrained by the number of printers 
in the town, or broadcasters with licenses. An infinite range of news and 
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opinion can be now gathered at almost no cost from the Internet, produced by 
professionals and, increasingly, amateurs (Berg 2006).  
 
A corollary of this argument is that regulations that are nationally based are simply 
rendered inoperable in an age of globally networked media. The assessment of 
Australian Internet activist Mark Newton of the Convergence Review couches such 
an argument in these terms: 
 
The Convergence Review is suffering from the same problems as the ALRC’s 
Classification Review, in that it’s searching for local provincial regulatory 
responses to a global phenomenon. By casting ‘convergence’ as an Australian 
media issue which requires an Australian regulatory response, it’s easy to 
predict that the results of the review will be obsolete by the time they’re 
published, overtaken by global developments which pay scant attention to 
Australian regulators (Newton 2011). 
 
Capitalist state theories tend to look for the dominant corporate interests in a field 
such a media policy, to determine whether they are the real forces driving such 
changes. Hesmondhalgh summarises the neo-Marxist perspective on media policy as 
one where “in general, policy bodies in modern capitalism work towards combining 
the accumualtion of capital on the part of businesses with a certain degree of popular 
legitimation”, even if such an analysis “does not always account for how they operate 
in practice” (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 125).  A common argument from this perspective 
is that much of the current ‘convergence talk’ overstates the significance of the 
changes taking place, in what what James Curran has termed “millenarian wish 
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fulfillment” by “the foes of established media organisations, hankering for the 
equivalent of divine retribution” (Curran 2010, 468). In a similar vein, Graeme Turner 
critiques “digital optimists” who, he argues, draw upon a binary opposition between 
old and new media, where “the old media is corporate, bullying, exploitative, elitist 
and anti-democratic, while the new media is grassroots, collaborative, independent, 
customizable, empowering and democratic” (Turner 2010, 128).  
 
The Challenges of Convergence  
 
The 2010s have been a period in which significant proposals for media reform have 
been developed through comprehensive policy reviews. In the United Kingdom, the 
Leveson Report has been the most prominent public engagement with questions of 
how to regulate news media and journalism (discussed by Des Freedman in this 
volume), but the current government has also committed to a comprehensive review 
of the Communications Act, with new legislation to go to Parliament by 2014 (DCMS 
2012). In Singapore, the Media Development Authority completed a Media 
Convergence Review in 2012, observing that “policy and regulatory frameworks, 
which were designed for traditional media platforms and industry structures, are no 
longer able to cope with the characteristics of the converged media environment” 
(MDA 2012, 5). A range of reviews took place in Australia over 2011-12, including 
the Convergence Review (Convergence Review 2012), the Independent Media 
Inquiry (Finkelstein 2012), and the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Review of 
the National Classification Scheme (ALRC 2012; see Flew 2012; Flew and Swift 
2013 for reviews of these inquiries).  
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All of these inquiries have grappled with the observation, made by the Australian 
Communication and Media Authority (ACMA), that “regulation constructed on the 
premise that content could (and should) be controlled by how it is delivered is losing 
its force, both in logic and in practice” (ACMA 2011, 6). The Convergence Review 
observed that: 
 
Australia’s policy and regulatory framework for content services is still 
focused on the traditional structures of the 1990s – broadcasting and 
telecommunications. The distinction between these categories is increasingly 
blurred and these regulatory frameworks have outlived their original purpose 
(Convergence Review 2012: vii).  
 
In a similar vein, the former Chair of the Canadian Radio and Telecommunications 
Commission (CRTC), Konrad von Fickenstein, told the Banff World Media Festival 
in 2011 that: 
 
The industry is going through fundamental change in technology, in business 
models and in corporate structures. It has become a single industry, thoroughly 
converged and integrated. Yet it continues to be regulated under … separate 
Acts, which date from 20 years ago. Authority continues to be divided among 
different departments and agencies (Theckedath and Thomas 2012, 4).  
 
Convergence has been defined as “the interlinking of computing and ICTs, 
communication networks, and media content that has occurred with the development 
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and popularisation of the Internet, and the convergent products, services and activities 
that have emerged in the digital media space” (Flew 2008, 28). Meikle and Young 
(2011) have proposed that convergence can be understood across four dimensions: 
 
• Technological—the combination of computing, communications and content 
around networked digital media platforms; 
• Industrial—the engagement of established media institutions in the digital 
media space, and the rise of digitally-based companies such as Google, Apple, 
Microsoft and others as significant media content providers; 
• Social—the rise of social network media and Web 2.0 services such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and the growth of user-created content;  
• Textual—the re-use and remixing of media into what has been termed a 
‘transmedia’ model, where stories and media content (for example, sounds, 
images, written text) are dispersed across multiple media platforms. 
 
In its Review of the National Classification Scheme, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC 2012, 66-74) observed that convergence occurs in parallel with a 
series of other changes in the global media and communications environment: 
 
1. Increased access to, and use of, high-speed broadband Internet. It has been 
estimated by Cisco that the global IP traffic in 2016 will be greater than that 
for every year from 1984 to 2012, as 3.4 billion people are now accessing the 
Internet, using 19 billion networked devices (Cisco 2012); 
2. Digitisation of media products and services. It is estimated that 72 hours of 
video are uploaded every minute onto YouTube, and four billion videos are 
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viewed every day worldwide from that site alone. Similarly, the Apple iTunes 
store sells over 10 million songs per day, making it by far the major music 
retailer worldwide.  
3. Globalisation of media platforms, content and services. At one level, it can be 
argued that media globalisation is not a new phenomenon, as Hollywood 
movies and American television programs have been a feature of the global 
media landscape for most of the 20th century. What has changed has been the 
extent to which digital media content can be sourced, distributed and accessed 
from any point in the world to any other point in the world. This has led to the 
rise of content distributors such as YouTube, and media platforms such as 
Apple iTunes and Android Market, that sit across national boundaries and 
regimes of jurisdictional authority.  
4. Acceleration of innovation. The World Intellectual Property Office has 
observed, for example, that the number of patent applications worldwide has 
grown from about 1 million in 1995 to 1.9 million in 2008, and the number of 
patents granted has grown from 450,000 in 1995 to 750,000 in 2008 (WIPO 
2010). 
5. Rise of user-created content. An important shift in the media associated with 
convergence is the rise of user-created content, and a shift in the nature of 
media users from audiences to participants, resulting in the blurring of a once 
relatively clear distinction between media producers and consumers (Jenkins 
2006; Bruns 2008; Leadbeater 2008).  
6. Greater media user empowerment. The rise of user-created content and the 
shift in the nature of audiences towards a more participatory media culture is 
associated with greater user control over media. This is partly related to a 
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greater diversity of choices of media content and platforms, but also in the 
ability to achieve greater personalisation of the media content that one chooses 
to access.  
7. Blurring of public-private and age-based distinctions. Historically, there has 
been more extensive regulation applied to the media that has been publicly 
available or distributed (cinema, radio and television) than towards print 
media (books, newspapers, magazines), whose distribution and consumption 
were considered to be more private and personal in nature. As all media 
content is now increasingly distributed and consumed online, in environments 
that are public in terms of their access platforms yet private in terms of their 
consumption, it is substantially more difficult to restrict access to online 
content through age-based verification measures.  
 
Policy Dimensions of Media Convergence 
 
It is a feature of all current reviews of media policy that the radical changes in the 
media landscape require rethinking of both core principles and appropriate policy 
instruments. Five issues in particular have become considerably more complex: 
 
1. Identification of the relevant media industry actors, as the relationship 
between devices, platforms, services and content are becoming increasingly 
blurred, and as the rise of ‘new media’ giants such as Google and Apple raises 
new questions about their relationship to forms of media regulation, such as 
ownership and content rules, that have traditionally been premised upon 
established media industry ‘silos’; 
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2. The question of regulatory parity between ‘old media’ and ‘new media’ 
platforms and services. This has both a historical dimension, as the 
broadcasting industry has traditionally been subject to extensive forms of 
regulation, but also presents the question of parity between nationally-based 
media and ‘deterritorialised’ media platforms such as YouTube and IPTV; 
3. The question of equivalent treatment of media content across platforms, as 
digital content now moves easily between print, broadcast and online, and can 
be accessed across multiple devices; 
4. The threshold of influence for media content and its providers, or when is 
media ‘big enough’ for regulation to be appropriate, in light of the rapid 
growth of user-created content and small-scale online distribution platforms 
(e.g. blogging, online video hosting); 
5. The continued validity of distinctions commonly made between ‘media 
content’ and personal communication, and expectations that the latter should 
have ‘free speech’ protections from government oversight or censorship, as 
differences between modes of communications based on their ‘mass’ or 
‘public’ qualities are blurred in the context of media convergence.  
 
In relation to determining who are now the key media players in a convergent media 
environment, the contribution of media economist Eli Noam has provided important 
insights. Addressing the perennial question of whether the concentration of media 
ownership is increasing or decreasing, and using U.S. media from 1984 to 2005 as the 
basis for his empirical analysis, Noam (2009) finds that the “digital optimists” are 
right to perceive that concentration is less pronounced in 2005 than it was in 1984, 
and that the internet is an important part of that trend, but that the “digital pessimists” 
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have also been right to observe an increase in media concentration between 1996 and 
2005. Noam argues that the key to understanding media ownership questions lies in 
recognizing that a two-tier media system has been evolving, with large integrator 
firms operating in oligopolistic market structures being at its core, surrounded by a 
large number of specialist firms that undertake much of the actual content production 
(Noam 2009, 436-437). The second half of the 2010s was a period of crisis for many 
of the media conglomerates that had dominated the previous decade – companies such 
as Time-Warner, Disney, News Corporation, Viacom/CBS and Sony – triggering the 
debate about whether there is a “crisis of the media moguls”. But in many of the 
media markets in which these media giants operate, their challengers are now big ICT 
and software companies such as Google, Apple and Microsoft: newspapers compete 
for reader attention with online news portals; TV networks battle with YouTube for 
the attention of screen media consumers; TV programs, music and movies are 
increasingly downloaded from iTunes or Netflix; and so on.  
 
Form the perspective of media concentration measures, as considered by Noam, this 
generates questions of what constitutes the boundaries of an industry, a market etc. 
from the perspective of media policy and regulation, it also presents the question of 
territorial jurisdiction. Broadcasters have been regulated by governments not only 
because of their perceived influence in a given community, but also because they 
could. Governments have possessed the power to allocate access to spectrum, and 
broadcasters could be permitted to operate in a defined geographical space (nation, 
region, city) by virtue of being awarded a licence by the relevant regulatory agencies. 
In the case that comes closest to the key ideas of economic capture theory, such 
commercial broadcasting licences could secure above-average profits by restricting 
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competition, and these could constitute the basis for a series of quid pro quos to be 
attached, including commitments to local content, program standards, children’s 
programming, and programs for minority audiences (Flew 2006).  
 
The broadcast licencing regime has been challenged worldwide by cable and satellite 
television since the 1980s, as well as being criticised as anti-competitive and as 
thwarting innovation and the development of new services. In its 2000 report to the 
Australian government, the Productivity Commission argued that there was a need to 
dismantle “a policy framework that is inward looking, anti- competitive and 
restrictive” (Productivity Commission 2000, 5), although the fact that it continues 
over a decade later attests to the continuing political influence of Australia’s 
commercial free-to-air broadcasters. Whereas new services such as subscription 
television can be held accountable to national laws and regulations as part of their 
operating conditions, this is not the case with services such as YouTube or new 
Internet Protocol TV (IPTV) services, which effectively operate outside of national 
territorial jurisdictions.  
 
It is important to note that being outside of national regulatory systems is not the same 
as being unregulated. What goes up onto YouTube or onto Facebook can be managed, 
although it is through ex post mechanisms such as user ‘flagging’ for potentially 
inappropriate forms of content (Crawford and Lumby, 2011). On an international 
scale, some of the dilemmas this presents were seen in Google’s response to protests 
worldwide about the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ video posted on YouTube: while 
rejecting a U.S. State Department request to take down the video, and successfully 
defending its right to host the video in the U.S. Federal Court, it nonetheless geo-
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blocked access to the video in Libya, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan, 
for fear of further inflaming Muslim feelings about the offending video. Whatever the 
merits of the approach Google took to the video, it can be argued that “the incident 
shows … Google is acting like a court, deciding what content it keeps up and what it 
pulls  -- all without the sort of democratic accountability or transparency we have 
come to expect on questions of free expression and censorship” (Rosen 2012).  
 
The question of regulatory parity arose in the Australian context around the issue of 
local content requirements. The Convergence Review argued that government 
intervention to support the production and distribution of Australian and local content 
continued to be in the public interest:1 
 
There are considerable social and cultural benefits from the availability of 
content that reflects Australian identity, character and diversity. If left to the 
market alone, some culturally significant forms of Australian content, such as 
drama, documentary and children’s programs, would be under-produced 
(Convergence Review 2012, viii).  
 
While it is difficult to quantify the impact of existing Australian content standards for 
commercial free-to-air broadcasters, the Review estimated that the cost difference 
between imported content and locally produced content in the same program genre 
would be in the range of 1:4 to 1:10. Even if there is an audience preference for 
locally produced content, it was concluded that “while some Australian content may 
deliver higher ratings and therefore higher advertising revenues over time, in most 
cases this will not offset the substantially higher production costs” (Convergence 
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Review 2012, 64). It was estimated that the removal of existing Australian content 
requirements for commercial free-to-air broadcasters would lead to an overall 
reduction in expenditure on local production of 43 per cent, with a 90 per cent 
decrease in local drama expenditure and the complete disappearance of locally 
produced children’s programming: on top of the overall decline in local production, 
there would be a shift away from drama and children’s programming towards lower-
cost light entertainment genres (Convergence Review 2012, 64). This would lead to 
significant job losses in the Australian film and television industries, with 
considerable flow on effects, as well as having adverse social and cultural impacts, 
including reducing resources available for innovative forms of locally produced new 
media content (Convergence Review 2012, 65-66). 2  
 
While the Convergence Review discerned the adverse industry and cultural policy 
consequences of removing Australian content requirements for commercial free-to-air 
broadcasters, the question of what would be appropriate policies to secure local 
content production in the context of media convergence and demands for greater 
regulatory parity is less clear. The Convergence Review Committee proposed the 
creation of a Converged Content Production Fund that would assist with the funding  
of innovative content across media platforms. The Converged Content Production 
Fund would be supported by a mix of direct government funding, spectrum fees paid 
by radio and television broadcasters, and contributions to be made by eligible content 
service enterprises, in lieu of requirements to make a set amount of expenditure on 
local content.  
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The Convergence Review’s approach has its critics. Goldsmith and Thomas (2012) 
questioned whether “Australian content” was still being primarily defined in terms of 
the screen production industries and the staples of TV drama, documentaries and 
children’s programs, arguing that “its focus on the immediate agenda of the 
established Australian production sector, rather than the opportunities genuinely 
arising from new platforms and services, represents a lost opportunity” (Goldsmith 
and Thomas 2012, 450). Flynn (2012, 474) observed that “the lines between 
‘professional content’ and ‘user generated content’ are increasingly blurred”, and that 
“as more made-for-internet content is created, distinctions between professional and 
user generated content are likely to become contested”. Google Australia 
commissioned a study by the Boston Consulting Group, titled Culture Boom: How 
Digital Media are Invigorating Australia (Belza et. al. 2012), which argued that local 
content regulation in the new media environment were unnecessary, as Australian 
online content creators were already generating a consumer surplus for Australians as 
well as generating new export opportunities. Leonard (2012, 3) observed that “the 
broad cross- platform agenda [made] the Report unusual, if not unique, in global 
terms”. He observed that while the Convergence Review’s commitment to basing 
regulations on the size and influence of a content provider, rather than upon the 
platform upon which content was delivered, was ground breaking in terms of aiming 
to ‘future proof’ media legislation in the face of unpredictable convergence dynamics, 
such regulatory radicalism also ran the risk of upsetting both the established media 
players by not treating them as unique and special, while being seen as threatening the 
largely laissez faire media landscape in which the new media players have been able 
to emerge and flourish.  
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Paradoxes of Media Influence 
 
The question of the appropriate scope of convergent media policy necessarily returns 
us to questions of media influence. The various Australian media policy reviews in 
2011-12 dealt in different ways with media influence, but continued to see an ongoing 
role for public interest regulations in addressing it. The Convergence Review 
identified government regulation of media ownership as continuing to be important 
since: 
 
A concentration of services in the hands of a small number of operators can 
hinder the free flow of news, commentary and debate in a democratic society. 
Media ownership and control rules are vital to ensure that a diversity of news 
and commentary is maintained (Convergence Review 2012, viii).  
 
In its National Classification Scheme Review, the ALRC acknowledged how media 
convergence had fragmented media audiences into a series of often non-overlapping 
niches, but nonetheless concluded that the concept of community standards in relation 
to media is not simply an artefact of limited media outlets, and that “the development 
of the Internet does not in itself provide a rationale for abandoning restrictions on 
content or regulations based on community standards” (ALRC 2012, 84).  
 
The question of media influence, or media power, typically comes in simple and 
complex variants. Simple variants may refer to the power of the Murdoch media, or 
Silvio Berlusconi, or FOX News, or the BBC, depending on what country you are in 
and often on what your political affiliations are. Yet such definitions are far too 
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subjective to operationalize from a policy viewpoint. A considerably more complex 
version can be found, for example in Manuel Castells’ Communication Power 
(Castells 2009). Defining power as “the relational capacity that enables a social actor 
to influence assymetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favour 
the empowered actor’s will, interests, and values” (Castells 2009, 10). Castells’ 
overall thesis is that power is shifting from identifiable media agents – the much-
discussed media moguls – to the networks themselves. Large media corporations can 
certainly play a dominant role within and through such networks, but so too, under 
certain circumstances, can much smaller yet more nimble entities, be they Wikileaks, 
environmental campaigners, or hacker groups such as Anonymous.  
 
In the Australian media policy reviews of 2011-12, there were two attempts to define 
more precisely the point at which a media entity may be deemed sufficiently 
influential as to warrant regulation. The first, and much criticized approach, was that 
of the Finkelstein Review into news media regulation, which proposed that news 
media and small press ‘publishers’ that would be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
News Media Council would include news internet sites that exceed 15,000 hits 
per annum, paralleling a readership for print-based media of 3,000 print copies per 
month (Finkelstein 2012, 295), a figure that was widely criticised as necessarily 
intruding upon blogging and very small online media that made no claims to be 
‘journalism’ in its traditional forms (Flew and Swift 2013).  
 
A more complex approach was developed by the Convergence Review through the 
concept of a Content Service Enterprise (CSE). The rationale behind CSEs was: 
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As media content of wide appeal is increasingly delivered on new platforms 
like the Internet and mobile networks, rules based on the concept of a 
‘broadcasting service’ are increasingly ineffective. A new approach is required 
that identifies the major media enterprises that the community expects to be 
regulated. 
 
The Review believes that a regulatory framework built around the scale and 
type of service provided by an enterprise rather than the platform of delivery is 
best suited to this environment. The Review has developed the concept of a 
‘content service enterprise’ to identify significant enterprises that have the 
most influence on Australians. 
 
The legislation currently declares that the degree of regulation should be in 
proportion to the level of ‘influence’ a category of service is ‘able to exert in 
shaping community views in Australia’ … Under the Review’s approach, the 
focus of regulation is significant enterprises that provide professional content 
to Australians (Convergence Review 2012, 7, 9).  
 
The Convergence Review proposed three criteria whereby a media firm could be 
considered to be a CSE: 
 
1. Professionally produced content over whose distribution it had effective 
control; 
2. Significant revenues derived from Australian-sourced content: the Review 
proposed a threshold figure of $50 million a year; 
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3. A significant Australian audience and/or number of Australian users: the 
threshold proposed was 500 000 a month. 
 
Using these criteria, it was proposed that the major radio and television broadcasters 
were CSEs, as were the News Limited and Fairfax media groups. Significantly, just 
outside of the revenue/user thresholds were Google, Apple and the leading Australian 
telecommunications company, Telstra. So while the CSEs in practice were largely the 
already-regulated broadcasters, the Convergence Review clearly flagged that since 
“the relative influence of significant media enterprises will change over time”, the 
CSE framework would “provide a flexible model under which community 
expectations of major media entities may be fulfilled into the future, regardless of the 
technology or delivery platform used” (Convergence Review 2012, 13). It rejected the 
proposition that there should be an ‘in principle’ rejection of measures to ‘regulate the 
Internet’, and held that overseas media enterprises operating in Australia should be 
subject to Australian regulations: 
 
There have been some suggestions that the Review’s recommendations for the 
regulation of content service enterprises represent an attempt to regulate the 
internet. The Review’s proposal for regulation of significant media entities, 
which are increasingly operating across a range of platforms, is specifically 
designed to be platform neutral. 
 
Any enterprise with a significant presence in Australia should be accountable 
in Australia. This is particularly true of those in the media. Just as online 
banking is regulated in the same way as banking in the branch, significant 
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media enterprises should be expected to meet the expectations of the 
Australian public irrespective of the platform used (Convergence Review 2012, 
13).  
 
Such proposals have met with opposition, from industry groups but also from media 
analysts. Leonard (2012) has pointed out that one aspect of the ‘radicalism’ of the 
proposals that has been of concern to industry is the manner in which the threshold 
kicks in, where a firm can go from not being extensively regulated to being 
extensively regulated on the basis of small changes in audience of revenue. Needless 
to say, the figures used to calculate the threshold are disputed, and it is difficult, for 
instance, to determine the Australian revenues of multinational companies such as 
Google or Apple. But such questions are by no means unique to media policy: there 
has in recent years been a growing campaign to ensure that such global companies 
pay a reasonable share of company tax in the countries they are located, and not be 
able to shift funds to low-tax havens in countries such as Bermuda (Drucker 2012). 
The key question raised here is whether it becomes appropriate at some threshold 
point to think of Internet companies as media companies, and hence appropriately the 
subjects of media policy and regulation, and not simply conduits for personal 





This chapter has identified a range of challenges to media policy arising out of 
changes in the global media environment associated with convergence, as well as 
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responses at the level of public policy to these developments. The concept of 
convergence refers at one level to the growing uncoupling of media content from 
particular devices and platforms, which challenges the 20th century model of 
platform-based media regulation. More broadly, it co-exists with a range of 
developments that include media globalisation, the rise of user-created content, 
accelerated innovation in media and related industries, and the ‘demassification’ of 
media generally.  
 
It has considered the Australian media enquiries of 2011-12, such as the Convergence 
Review, the ALRC National Classification Review, and the Finkelstein Review, to 
observe how they have sought to address five contemporary dilemmas of media 
policy: (1) determining who is a media company; (2) regulatory parity between ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ media; (3) treatment of similar media content across different platforms; 
(4) distinguishing ‘big media’ from user-created content; and (5) maintaining a 
distinction between media regulation and censorship of personal communication, 
given the very different history and architecture of the Internet as compared to 
broadcast media. At the heart of these are questions if what media influence now 
means in a convergent media environment, where the relationship between the 
provider and the platform is a shifting one, and where new media companies are as 
much enablers of content distribution as they are producers of media content.  
 
The media inquiries considered here have struggled to find the right balance in 
addressing these questions, but I would argue that the questions themselves remain at 
the core of 21st century media policy. In this respect, criticisms of media policy as 
simply outdated extensions of the ‘nanny state’, as argued by some economic capture 
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theorists, or as primarily reflections of an ascendant global neoliberalism, as argued 
by capitalist state theorists, underestimate the complexities of the issues arising. It 
may well be time to rethink the skepticism that many commentators have towards the 
concept of a ‘public interest’, and see it as something more than an ideological cloak 
for the nefarious activities of meddling bureaucrats or multinational media moguls. In 
doing so, we would also need to recognise that the circumstances in which public 
interest regulation is being pursued have become considerably more complex and 
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1 In the Convergence Review Final Report, ‘Australian content’ was taken to be that 
produced by Australians, while ‘local content’ was defined as ‘news and information 
that is of direct relevance to a local community’ (Convergence Review 2012, 175). 
For areas other than news and information, it is Australian content that is the relevant 
concept.  
 
2 As an example of what a less regulated media content environment would look like, 
the Convergence Review cited the digital multichannel services introduced after 2008 
by the commercial networks. While these new channels have been a ratings success, 
capturing up to 25 per cent of the television audience, Australian content accounts for 
only 5-21 per cent of total programming, as compared to 59-75 per cent for the main 
channels, and local drama content is 0-8 percent of total material broadcast on these 
largely unregulated channels (Convergence Review 2012, 69-70). 
 
3 The positions taken by online progressive groups towards the Australian media 
inquiries were many and varied, and at times internally contradictory. One catalyst for 
the call by the then leader of the Australian greens, Senator Bob Brown, for an inquiry 
into the news media, citing anti-Greens and anti-Labor bias in News Limited papers, 
which he labelled the ‘Hate Media’. The Finkelstein Review received almost 10,000 
submissions organised by the online activist groups Avaaz and NewsStand, arguing 
that this inquiry was “a historic opportunity to reform Australia's press to better serve 
the public interest, our democracy, and bring an end to powerful media monopolies”, 
and calling on the Review to recommend “a limit on media concentration and an 
adequately funded public interest media in Australia … [and] the creation of one 
strong and independent regulator that can hold all media to the same standards of 
conduct, and enable people to more easily monitor and report press misconduct” 
(Finkelstein 2012, 349). By contrast, the American academic and activist Naomi Wolf 
described the report as “step one to fascism” (quoted in Tiffen 2012), and the Director 
of the online activist group GetUp!, Sam McLean, argued that “we believe in freedom 
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of the press, and the model of regulation that has been put forward seems to us to cut 
across that important freedom. Governments shouldn’t be choosing who gets to 
picking and choosing who gets to have a voice and who doesn’t” (Packham 2012). 
The position of GetUp! is in fact closer to that of the Institute of Public Affairs than 
that of the Australian Greens, Avaaz or NewsStand, despite the general view of 
GetUp! as “left-wing” and the IPA as “right-wing” (see Flew and Swift 2013).   
